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Podcast brief

The Stoics vs. Plato: Blank Slate or Innate Ideas

Michael Tremblay and Caleb Ontiveros compare the Stoic view of the mind as a blank slate with Plato's theory of innate knowledge, and what each means for self-knowledge.

A Stoa brief of an episode from Stoa Conversations

Stoic Psychology: Are We Born Blank Slates? (Episode 233)

Published 50 min

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The episode belongs to its makers. This page summarizes its arguments in Stoa's words and points to the moments where they are made. Brief updated .

The brief

The conversation argues that the Stoics saw the newborn mind as genuinely blank, yet still built in enough natural structure, through what they called preconceptions, to explain why humans across cultures share basic moral categories. Michael Tremblay and Caleb Ontiveros use this question to unpack the Stoic image of the mind as an inner citadel: before asking how to guard the mind against bad impressions, it helps to ask what the mind was like at its founding.

They start with Plato's opposing view. In the Meno, Socrates leads a slave boy to a geometric truth he was never taught, which Plato takes as evidence that the soul already possessed the knowledge and is merely recollecting it. This answers the learner's paradox: if you have no prior grasp of a claim, you cannot recognize it as true when you encounter it, so real knowledge must already be latent in you. The Stoics reject this. Drawing on Aetius, the hosts describe the newborn mind as a blank sheet on which sense impressions are inscribed, accumulating over time into experience. Nothing is present at birth beyond the capacity to receive impressions.

The strongest objection to the Stoic view is that a truly blank slate cannot explain why people everywhere converge on concepts like justice and goodness. The Stoics answer with preconceptions, natural dispositions to form general categories by around age seven. Epictetus's example of the Egyptian who understands the charge of injustice while disputing its application shows the pattern: everyone shares the category, but not its content. Michael and Caleb note that this narrows the gap with Plato considerably, since modern parallels such as core cognition theory and preparedness theory (illustrated by Cook and Mineka's monkey and snake experiments) suggest minds carry some innate structure that still needs experience to activate.

They close on proto-passions, impressions that carry motivational pull before rational judgment sets in. Self-knowledge, on this account, means learning both your built-in tendencies and how experience has shaped you. It also gives the Stoics a reply to ethical relativism: if humans share the same basic conceptual ground, moral disagreement is a dispute within a common framework, not proof that there is no framework at all.

Strongest arguments

The inner citadel raises the question of the mind's origin

1:14

Michael frames the inquiry through the Stoic image of the mind as a guarded city, drawn from Marcus Aurelius and Epictetus. Guarding the city against bad impressions raises a prior question: what was the city like at its founding, and does it have any innate features?

Plato: recollection and the learner's paradox

5:57

Michael lays out Plato's view that the soul is immortal and has already seen everything, so learning is really recollection, using the Meno's slave boy passage and the myth of Er. This solves the learner's paradox: you cannot learn something entirely new because you would have no way to verify a novel claim, so knowledge must already be latent within you.

The Stoic tabula rasa and impressions

11:37

Michael cites Aetius's description of the newborn mind as blank paper on which concepts are inscribed through sense impressions, which accumulate into experience. This is the Stoic alternative to Plato: nothing is present at birth, and everything is built from perception.

Preconceptions explain shared human categories without innate content

22:34

To explain cross-cultural agreement on categories like justice and goodness despite starting blank, the Stoics posit preconceptions, natural dispositions to form certain general concepts by around age seven. Epictetus's example of the Egyptian who understands the charge of injustice while disputing its application shows that preconceptions supply only the category, not its content, so people can share a concept while disagreeing about what falls under it.

The two views may converge more than they first appear

29:15

Michael and Caleb consider that once the Stoics admit preconceptions, and Plato's position is read as positing only a few innate categories, the practical gap between the two narrows. The real disagreement becomes a matter of degree: how much structure or content the mind carries at birth, not whether experience matters at all.

Modern psychology mirrors the ancient debate

36:45

Michael describes core cognition theory, which posits a small set of innate conceptual categories such as objects, number, and minds, as a modest echo of Plato's nativism. He also describes preparedness theory, illustrated by Cook and Mineka's experiment showing monkeys rapidly learn to fear snakes but not flowers, as resembling the Stoic idea of dispositions that still require experience to trigger them.

Proto-passions and the practical upshot for self-knowledge

40:48

Caleb raises whether some impressions, like the sight of a threatening animal, carry pre-rational motivational force beyond plain sensory impressions such as the color white. Michael connects this to Stoic proto-passions and cataleptic impressions, concluding that self-knowledge requires understanding both these built-in tendencies and how experience has shaped us, which also pushes back against relativism by pointing to shared conceptual ground for ethical inquiry.

Concepts discussed

  • Impressions The way things first strike the mind, which must be examined and not taken at face value before we react to them.

Philosophers and works discussed

Questions this episode answers

  • Did the Stoics believe humans are born as blank slates?

    11:37

    Yes. Aetius describes the newborn mind as a blank sheet of paper on which concepts are inscribed through sense impressions that accumulate into experience, though the Stoics also held that humans naturally form certain shared categories called preconceptions.

  • What is Plato's theory of recollection in the Meno?

    5:57

    Plato argues the soul is immortal and has already learned everything across past lives, so what looks like learning is actually recollection, demonstrated by Socrates guiding a slave boy to solve a geometry problem he was never taught.

  • What is the learner's paradox?

    11:04

    The learner's paradox asks how you could ever learn something new: if you already recognize a claim as true you have not learned anything, and if you have no prior grasp of it you cannot tell whether it is true or false. Plato uses this to argue that knowledge must already be latent and recovered through recollection.

  • What are Stoic preconceptions and how do they explain shared moral concepts across cultures?

    22:34

    Preconceptions are natural dispositions to form certain general categories, like good, bad, just, and unjust, by around age seven, so people across cultures grasp the concept of injustice even though they disagree about which specific acts count as unjust, illustrated by Epictetus's example of the Egyptian.

  • What are Stoic proto-passions and cataleptic impressions?

    42:29

    Proto-passions are impressions that carry a pre-rational motivational force that moves us before rational judgment, and cataleptic impressions are impressions with a similarly compelling, gripping quality. The Stoic advice is to slow down and pause before assenting to impressions with this kind of force, such as in an angry crowd.

Related primary passages

Some things are in our control and others not. Things in our control are opinion, pursuit, desire, aversion, and, in a word, whatever are our own actions. Things not in our control are body, property, reputation, command, and, in one word, whatever are not our own actions.

Epictetus, Handbook 1 Read in context

This is the founding statement of the dichotomy of control, the axis the rest of Epictetus's teaching turns on.

Work, therefore to be able to say to every harsh appearance, "You are but an appearance, and not absolutely the thing you appear to be.

Epictetus, Handbook 1 Read in context

The opening move of the Handbook: put distance between the raw appearance and your judgment about it.

He who acts unjustly acts impiously. For since the universal nature has made rational animals for the sake of one another to help one another according to their deserts, but in no way to injure one another, he who transgresses her will, is clearly guilty of impiety towards the highest divinity.

Marcus Aurelius, Meditations 9.1 Read in context

The opening claim of the whole meditation: injustice is not a social lapse but a break with the rational order that made us for each other.

Sources

  1. Epictetus, Handbook Primary text, Stoa library
  2. Marcus Aurelius, Meditations Primary text, Stoa library
  3. Stoa Conversations, Stoic Psychology: Are We Born Blank Slates? (Episode 233) Podcast episode, original episode