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What does Epictetus mean by things in our control and not in our control?

A close look at the opening line of the Handbook, where Epictetus draws the line between what is up to us and what is not.

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The short answer

Epictetus opens the Handbook by dividing everything into two categories: things in our control, which are opinion, pursuit, desire, aversion, and in general our own actions, and things not in our control, which are body, property, reputation, command, and whatever is not our own action. The first category is naturally free and unhindered because nothing external can take it from you. The second is naturally weak and slavish because outside forces can always interfere with it, no matter how much effort you put in.

Key points

  • Epictetus divides all things into what is in our control and what is not, at the very start of the Handbook.
  • What is in our control is limited to opinion, pursuit, desire, aversion, and our own actions.
  • What is not in our control includes body, property, reputation, and command, since external forces can always interfere with them.
  • The things in our control are called free and unhindered, and the things not in our control are called slavish and belonging to others.
  • Mistaking what belongs to others for your own is, on Epictetus's account, the root of being hindered, disturbed, and blaming gods and men.

The longer answer

What is in our control is a short list: opinion, pursuit, desire, aversion, and in a word, whatever are our own actions. Everything else, body, property, reputation, command, belongs to the other category, whatever are not our own actions (Handbook 1). Notice how narrow the first list is. It is not your career, your health, your marriage, or how people speak of you. It is your judgments and your choices about how to respond to what happens to you.

The common misreading treats this as a tip about focus: worry about what you can influence, let go of the rest, and you will feel calmer. That reading is not wrong exactly, but it flattens the claim. Epictetus is not offering a stress management technique. He is telling you where your identity actually lives. The things in our control are by nature free, unrestrained, unhindered, while the things not in our control are weak, slavish, restrained, belonging to others (Handbook 1). That is a claim about what you are, not just about what you should think about. You are, at bottom, your faculty of judgment and choice. Your body, your reputation, your career, even your children's safety, are not you. They can be taken, damaged, or lost by forces entirely outside your judgment.

This is why "control" is a slightly misleading word for the English reader, even though it is the traditional translation. The point is not that you have no influence over your body or your reputation. You can train, eat well, work hard, speak honestly. The point is that nothing about these things is guaranteed by your effort alone. An illness can strike the disciplined athlete. A slander can ruin the honest man's name. Since something external can always intervene and thwart the outcome, the outcome itself is never, strictly, up to you. Only your opinion, your pursuit, your desire, your aversion, the movements of your own mind, cannot be taken from you by anything outside you.

Epictetus draws out the stakes immediately. If you suppose that things which are slavish by nature are also free, and that what belongs to others is your own, then you will be hindered. You will lament, you will be disturbed, and you will find fault both with gods and men (Handbook 1). This is the diagnosis behind most ordinary unhappiness, on his account. You invested your sense of what is good or bad in something that was never fully yours to secure, so when it goes badly, you experience it as violation, and you look for someone to blame, fate, other people, even the gods.

Taking this seriously changes what you count as success or failure. If your job is not "in our control," then losing a promotion is not, in the strict sense, bad for you. It is a dispreferred indifferent, something you can reasonably prefer to avoid but that does not touch your character. What is genuinely bad is judging poorly, wanting badly, or acting like a coward or a liar. That is a demanding claim, and Epictetus does not soften it. He is not saying external things do not matter at all. He is saying they are not where good and bad live.

A practical way to use this: before reacting to any setback, ask which part of what just happened was actually up to you. Usually it is smaller than it feels. Your reaction, your next choice, your judgment about what occurred, that part remains yours regardless of the outcome. Everything else was always on loan.

Primary passages

Some things are in our control and others not. Things in our control are opinion, pursuit, desire, aversion, and, in a word, whatever are our own actions. Things not in our control are body, property, reputation, command, and, in one word, whatever are not our own actions.

Epictetus, Handbook 1 Read in context

The opening distinction of the Handbook, stated as plainly as Epictetus ever states anything.

The things in our control are by nature free, unrestrained, unhindered; but those not in our control are weak, slavish, restrained, belonging to others.

Epictetus, Handbook 1 Read in context

This is the claim about identity and freedom, not just a tip about where to focus attention.

Remember, then, that if you suppose that things which are slavish by nature are also free, and that what belongs to others is your own, then you will be hindered. You will lament, you will be disturbed, and you will find fault both with gods and men.

Epictetus, Handbook 1 Read in context

Epictetus's diagnosis of ordinary unhappiness: mistaking what is external for what is truly your own.

Important distinctions

Control versus influence

Epictetus is not saying you have zero influence over your body, property, or reputation. You can train, save, and act honorably. The claim is narrower: none of these outcomes is guaranteed by your effort alone, because something external can always intervene. Since the outcome can be thwarted from outside, it is not, strictly, up to you. Only your own judgments and choices cannot be taken by force or circumstance.

Not in our control versus worthless

Body, property, and reputation fall outside our control, but Epictetus does not call them worthless. Stoic ethics classes them as preferred or dispreferred indifferents: things reasonable to pursue or avoid, but not the measure of a good or bad life. The mistake is putting your sense of good and bad into them, not preferring health over sickness.

Objections and replies

This sounds like it asks people not to care about outcomes

If reputation, health, and career are not in our control, it can sound like Epictetus is telling people to stop caring whether they succeed at their work or keep their health.

Reply

Epictetus does not say these things don't matter at all, only that they are not what makes you good or bad. You can still pursue health and a good name reasonably. What changes is where you locate your sense of success: in the quality of your effort and judgment, not in whether the external result lands in your favor.

The line between the two categories can feel unclear in practice

Actions like taking a test or having a difficult conversation involve both your effort and outside factors like luck or another person's response, so it is not obvious which part is up to you.

Reply

Epictetus's answer is that your effort, preparation, and the judgments and choices you make in the moment are up to you, while the result, which depends partly on others and chance, is not. The discipline is in separating the two even when they arrive bundled together.

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Guided courses in the Stoa app that put this into daily practice.

Related questions

Sources

  1. Epictetus, Handbook Primary text, Stoa library