Question
How does Epictetus say we should respond when someone insults or wrongs us?
Epictetus argues that a person who insults you is not attacking something of yours, and that this fact should change how you respond.
Updated
The short answer
Epictetus says the insult does not actually harm you, because reputation was never within your control to begin with. The person insulting you is acting on their own mistaken judgment, and that false judgment harms them, not you. His practical instruction is to bear the person meekly and tell yourself, "it seemed so to him," rather than treating the insult as a wound to something that was yours.
Key points
- Epictetus treats an insult as evidence about the speaker's judgment, not as damage to the person insulted.
- He argues the offender is the one truly hurt, since acting on a false appearance is itself a kind of harm to the one who holds it.
- Reputation appears in Handbook 1 among the things not in our control, which is why Epictetus says an insult cannot touch what is actually yours.
- The prescribed response is not suppression or retaliation but the line 'it seemed so to him,' said as an accurate description, not a coping trick.
- Zeus's speech in the Discourses explains why only the faculty of choice, and not the body or reputation, was given to us as fully our own.
The longer answer
Epictetus's argument starts from a claim about the other person's mind, not about yours. When someone harms you or speaks badly of you, he says, remember that "he acts or speaks from a supposition of its being his duty" (Handbook 42). The insult, from the inside, feels justified to the person giving it. He cannot act on what seems right to you, only on what seems right to himself.
From there Epictetus draws a conclusion that most people resist. If the other person is judging from a false appearance, "he is the person hurt, since he too is the person deceived" (Handbook 42). He gives an analogy: if someone takes a true proposition to be false, the proposition suffers nothing. The person who is wrong about it is the one who suffers, because he is walking around with a false belief. An insult works the same way. The words do not damage you. The false judgment behind them damages the person who holds it, because a distorted view of the world is itself a kind of harm to the one who holds it.
That misses what Epictetus is actually claiming. He is not offering a mood hack. He is applying the dichotomy of control that opens the Handbook: some things are in our power and some are not, and reputation is explicitly listed among the things that are not (Handbook 1). Your reputation, how you look in another person's eyes, was never yours to begin with. It belongs to them, since it is their judgment. So when someone insults you, they are not touching anything of yours. They are exercising a judgment that belongs to them, badly.
This is also why Epictetus does not tell you to retaliate, defend your name, or even feel wounded and suppress it. His conclusion is that you will "meekly bear a person who reviles you," and the internal move he prescribes is simple: say to yourself, "it seemed so to him" (Handbook 42). That sentence is not resignation. It is an accurate description of what happened: a person acted on his own mistaken appearance, and nothing that is actually yours, your judgments, your choices, your character, was touched by it.
The deeper reason this matters is in Zeus's speech in the Discourses. Epictetus imagines Zeus explaining why he could not make the body and property free from hindrance, but gave human beings something else instead: "this faculty of pursuing an object and avoiding it, and the faculty of desire and aversion, and, in a word, the faculty of using the appearances of things." Take care of that faculty and treat it as your only real possession, and "you will never be hindered... you will not lament, you will not blame, you will not flatter any person" (Discourses I 1). Reputation was left outside that gift on purpose. It was never going to be fully yours, so building your peace on it was always going to fail.
None of this says the other person did nothing wrong. Epictetus is not excusing bad behavior. He is locating where the actual damage lands, and it is not on you. What changes for someone who takes this seriously is where they put their attention after being insulted. Instead of building a case for why they were wronged, they ask a narrower question: did anything that is actually mine, my judgment, my choice, get damaged here. Usually the honest answer is no.
A concrete practice follows directly from the text. The next time someone insults you, before you respond, say the line to yourself: it seemed so to him. Not as a slogan to make the sting go away, but as a true description of what just happened. Then decide, separately, whether anything up to you, your own action, needs correcting.
Primary passages
Some things are in our control and others not. Things in our control are opinion, pursuit, desire, aversion, and, in a word, whatever are our own actions. Things not in our control are body, property, reputation, command, and, in one word, whatever are not our own actions.
Epictetus, Handbook 1 Read in context
Reputation is explicitly listed among the things not in our control, which is why an insult cannot touch what is actually yours.
this body is not yours, but it is clay finely tempered. And since I was not able to do for you what I have mentioned, I have given you a small portion of us, this faculty of pursuing an object and avoiding it, and the faculty of desire and aversion, and, in a word, the faculty of using the appearances of things
Epictetus, Discourses I 1 Read in context
Zeus's speech explains why reputation was never handed to us as our own possession in the first place.
Important distinctions
Not touched versus not wronged
Epictetus is not saying the other person did nothing wrong or that insults are fine. He is saying that whatever they did, it did not damage anything that is actually yours, since your judgments, choices, and character remain up to you regardless of what someone says about you. Whether the offender acted badly is a separate question from whether you were harmed.
Coping phrase versus accurate description
'It seemed so to him' can sound like a trick to make an insult sting less. In Epictetus's argument it is meant literally: the person really was acting on their own appearance of what seemed right, and that is simply a true account of what happened, not a technique for feeling better.
Objections and replies
This sounds like it excuses cruelty
If the offender is always described as merely deceived, it can sound like Epictetus removes responsibility for wrongdoing and asks the wronged person to simply absorb it.
Epictetus is analyzing where the damage lands, not issuing a verdict on the offender's character. Handbook 1 makes clear that only your own judgments and actions are up to you. Deciding how to respond, including whether correction or distance from the person is warranted, is still up to you. The claim is narrower than it looks: the insult itself does not damage what is yours, which is a separate question from whether the other person acted well.
Not all insults are baseless
Sometimes the criticism is accurate. The framework in Handbook 42 seems built for insults based on false appearances, so what about true ones.
The passage argues from the assumption that the offender is acting from a wrong appearance, but even a true criticism does not damage your faculty of choice. If the criticism is accurate, the same dichotomy still applies: your reputation is not yours to control, so the right response is examining whether your own judgment or action was actually at fault, not defending how you appear.
Practice this in Stoa
Guided courses in the Stoa app that put this into daily practice.
Related questions
-
What does Epictetus mean by things in our control and not in our control?
A close look at the opening line of the Handbook, where Epictetus draws the line between what is up to us and what is not.
-
What is really in my control according to the Stoics?
A look at Epictetus's opening claim in the Handbook: what actually counts as up to you, and why the answer is narrower than most people think.
-
What is the Stoic teaching of the two handles in Epictetus's Handbook?
A short teaching from Epictetus on choosing how to grasp what happens to you, and why that choice is up to you even when the event is not.
-
What maxims does Epictetus recommend keeping ready at hand?
A look at the three quotations Epictetus tells his students to hold close, and what they teach about accepting what is not up to us.
-
How does Epictetus use the metaphor of an actor in a drama to describe our role in life?
A short lesson from the Handbook on why you do not choose your part, only how well you play it.
-
What does Epictetus advise about desire and aversion for beginners?
Epictetus tells the beginner to suspend desire almost entirely and redirect aversion only toward what is truly up to them.
-
Why does Epictetus say to call a dead child or spouse 'returned' rather than 'lost'?
Epictetus reframes loss as a return to correct a false judgment about what was ever yours to keep.
-
How should a Stoic respond to insults or mockery?
A look at what Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius actually say about being insulted, and why the insult is never the real problem.
Podcast discussions
-
Michael Trombley and Caleb on Emily Wilson's Critique of Epictetus
Michael Trombley and Caleb examine classicist Emily Wilson's three criticisms of Epictetus and test whether they hold up against the Discourses and Handbook.
-
The Stoics vs. Plato: Blank Slate or Innate Ideas
Michael Tremblay and Caleb Ontiveros compare the Stoic view of the mind as a blank slate with Plato's theory of innate knowledge, and what each means for self-knowledge.
-
Caleb Ontiveros on Why Stoic Happiness Must Be Up to Us
Caleb Ontiveros and Michael Tremblay lay out and stress-test the Stoic case that happiness must depend on us, not on the world.
-
Is Christopher Nolan's Odyssey More Stoic Than Homer's?
Caleb Ontiveros reads Christopher Nolan's film adaptation of the Odyssey against Stoic ideas about the gods, agency, duty, and perseverance.
-
Ryan Holiday Runs Rome's Stoic Sites
Ryan Holiday narrates a solo 50-kilometer run past Rome's Stoic landmarks to draw out lessons about voluntary hardship and endurance.
-
Stoic Lessons on Power and Complicity from Roman History
Two hosts tour Roman political history to argue that Stoic virtue demanded active participation in public life, not withdrawal from it.
Related concepts, philosophers and works
Sources
- Epictetus, Discourses I Primary text, Stoa library
- Epictetus, Handbook Primary text, Stoa library