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Question

How should you respond to someone who wrongs you, according to Marcus Aurelius?

Marcus Aurelius argues that expecting wrongdoers not to exist is expecting the impossible, and that this recognition should make you milder toward the person who wronged you, not angrier.

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The short answer

Marcus Aurelius says that when someone wrongs you, you should first ask whether it is possible for shameless, dishonest, or faithless people not to exist at all. Since it is not possible, demanding otherwise is demanding the impossible. Recognizing this should make you more kindly disposed toward the person, not less, and it should prompt you to meet the wrong with the specific virtue nature gave you to answer it, such as mildness against foolishness.

Key points

  • Marcus argues that wrongdoers of every kind must exist in the world, so being offended that they exist is demanding the impossible.
  • This recognition is meant to make you more kindly disposed toward the person who wronged you, not to excuse the wrong.
  • Marcus says nature has given people specific virtues, such as mildness, as antidotes matched to specific kinds of wrongdoing.
  • The method applies broadly, to the shameless man, the knave, and the faithless man alike.
  • Elsewhere Marcus notes that things like pain or dishonor fall equally on good and bad people, so they cannot by themselves make a life good or bad.

The longer answer

Marcus does not ask you to pretend the wrong did not happen, or to tell yourself it does not matter. He asks you to check a hidden demand you are making on reality: that shameless, faithless, wrongdoing people simply should not exist. When someone wrongs you, he writes, ask yourself whether it is possible that shameless men should not be in the world. It is not possible. Do not, then, require what is impossible (Meditations 9.42).

This is a strange kind of comfort at first. It sounds like he is excusing the offender. He is not. He is diagnosing the source of your anger. Part of what makes wrongdoing feel intolerable is the sense that it should not be happening, that the world has gone wrong in some deep way because this person acted badly. Marcus's point is that a world with no dishonest people, no cowards, no cruel people, is not a world you were ever entitled to expect. Wrongdoers of every kind are, as he puts it, of necessity in the world (Meditations 9.42). Once you see that, the offense loses some of its charge. You are no longer fighting reality itself, only responding to one instance of something you already knew would occur somewhere, to someone, eventually.

The common misreading is that this is resignation: shrug it off, nothing can be done, don't get worked up. That misses what Marcus actually recommends doing with the thought. He says that reminding yourself wrongdoers must exist will make you more kindly disposed toward the person in front of you (Meditations 9.42). The aim is not detachment but a change in disposition, from hostility to something closer to patience. He extends this beyond the shameless man to the knave, the faithless man, and every man who does wrong in any way (Meditations 9.42), so the method is general: whatever the fault, first place it in the category of things bound to occur, then let your anger soften.

Marcus adds a second, more active idea. Nature has not left you defenseless against wrongdoing. She has given to man, as an antidote against the stupid man, mildness, and against another kind of man some other power (Meditations 9.42). This matters because it shows Marcus is not asking for passivity. Each vice in another person has a corresponding virtue in you that answers it, and mildness is the specific virtue matched to a certain kind of foolishness or shamelessness. You are not just tolerating the wrong. You are exercising the trait built for exactly this situation.

What changes for someone who takes this seriously is where they locate the problem. The wrong stays wrong. But your task shifts from expecting people to be other than they are, to responding well given what they are. That is a version of the Stoic idea that only your own judgments, impulses and reactions are up to you. The wrongdoer's character is not up to you. Your mildness, or your anger, is.

Elsewhere in the Meditations Marcus applies a related principle to externals more broadly: things like pain, dishonour, or death happen equally to good and bad people, so they cannot themselves be what makes a life good or bad (Meditations 2.11). Someone else's wrongdoing toward you falls into a similar frame. It can happen to anyone, good or bad, and how it lands on your character depends on what you do with it, not on the fact that it occurred.

The practical move Marcus offers is simple to state and harder to do. The next time someone's dishonesty or cruelty catches you off guard, ask yourself the question he asks: could a world with no such people possibly exist. When the honest answer is no, let that lower the temperature, then reach for the specific virtue, mildness or otherwise, that meets this particular fault.

Primary passages

Is it possible, then, that shameless men should not be in the world? It is not possible. Do not, then, require what is impossible.

Marcus Aurelius, Meditations 9.42 Read in context

The core move: check the hidden, impossible demand behind your anger.

Let the same considerations be present to your mind in the case of the knave, and the faithless man, and of every man who does wrong in any way. For at the same time that you do remind yourself that it is impossible that such kind of men should not exist, you will become more kindly disposed towards every one individually.

Marcus Aurelius, Meditations 9.42 Read in context

Marcus generalizes the method and states its purpose plainly: kindliness, not resignation.

It is useful to perceive this, too, immediately when the occasion arises, what virtue nature has given to man to oppose to every wrongful act. For she has given to man, as an antidote against the stupid man, mildness, and against another kind of man some other power.

Marcus Aurelius, Meditations 9.42 Read in context

The active complement to the first move: a specific virtue answers each specific fault.

Important distinctions

Accepting that wrongdoers exist versus excusing a wrong act

Marcus's point is about the category of person, not the specific act. Recognizing that shameless people must exist somewhere in the world is not the same as saying this particular shameless act was fine. The wrong remains wrong. What changes is whether you add the extra burden of expecting a world without such people.

Mildness versus passivity

Mildness, in Marcus's sense, is an active virtue matched against a specific fault, not simply letting things go. He calls it an antidote, something nature equips you with to oppose the wrongful act, which suggests a deliberate response rather than mere non-reaction.

Objections and replies

Doesn't this let wrongdoers off the hook

If you tell yourself that shameless or faithless people must exist, it can sound like you are excusing the specific person in front of you, or removing any reason to hold them accountable.

Reply

Marcus is addressing your internal reaction, not the question of consequences or correction. Accepting that wrongdoers exist as a category does not stop you from responding to this wrongdoer through fair means, such as correction or refusal to cooperate with the wrong. What it changes is the anger you carry into that response.

Is mildness always the right virtue

Marcus names mildness as the antidote to the stupid man, but says another kind of man calls for some other power, without specifying what that is in every case.

Reply

The passage itself is honest about this limit: the antidote depends on the kind of wrongdoing. The consistent instruction is to identify the specific virtue that meets the specific fault, rather than assuming one response fits every wrong.

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Sources

  1. Marcus Aurelius, Meditations Primary text, Stoa library